Ukraine's High-Tech Battle Against Russian Drone Attacks

In this strategic update, we will analyze the decisive role played by the Iranian Shahed 136 drone in the current war and review the latest Ukrainian developments, as well as collaborative efforts with allied countries, to counter this threat. The fight against the Shahed has become a race for Ukraine, combining innovation, technological development, and crucial economic analysis to achieve its complete eradication.

The Shahed 136 drone made its appearance in the war in Ukraine in September 2022. It is a drone developed and manufactured by the Iranian companies HESA and Shahed, introduced in late 2021. This fixed-wing drone is 3.5 meters long with a wingspan of 2.5 meters, carries a payload of 40 kilograms of explosives, including thermobaric variants, and has a range exceeding 2000 kilometers. Initial versions rely on a navigation system supported by GPS. Its weaknesses are a relatively low flight speed of up to 160 kilometers per hour and the loud noise produced by its piston engine. However, the most critical feature of the Shahed 136 is its extraordinarily low cost, approximately 40,000 dollars, which allows it to be deployed in large numbers and has posed significant dilemmas for Ukrainian forces regarding which weapons and countermeasures to use. Using an expensive anti-aircraft missile to shoot down a low-cost drone is not a viable long-term solution, not even with the cheapest MANPAD used by Ukraine, which doubles in cost the Shahed, let alone systems like Patriot, in the millions of dollars per interceptor missile.

The most strategically significant role of the Shahed in the current war stems from two aspects. Firstly, its ability to be deployed in large numbers as a swarm, has greatly enhanced the effectiveness of other more advanced Russian weaponry, such as cruise and ballistic missiles, used in conjunction with massive, coordinated attacks with altering flight paths to disperse and exhaust Ukrainian air defense efforts. Secondly, according to multiple analysts, the Shahed 136 has played a decisive role in various Russian campaigns targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure, exploiting Ukraine’s inability to cover a large number of dispersed small targets, such as power substations and small generation plants. Approximately 50% of the total damage to Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is estimated to be directly caused by the Shahed 136.

Since its appearance, Ukraine has developed an entire arsenal of weapons and countermeasures aimed at destroying the Shahed 136. These include anti-aircraft missile batteries and MANPADS, anti-aircraft armored vehicles such as the Gepard, aerial attacks from MiG-29 fighters, helicopters, and, more recently, F-16s, as well as mobile anti-aircraft units equipped with pickup trucks and Browning heavy machine guns. These mobile units coordinate their attacks through an alert network developed using sensors and microphones that detect the drone’s sound signature, allowing them to locate and track the threats. However, each of these measures has some drawbacks, making the fight against the Shahed ineffective.

Anti-aircraft missiles and MANPADS generally have a higher or significantly higher cost, limiting their availability to protect very high-value targets. Similarly, the use of fighters and helicopters is typically prioritized for intercepting cruise missiles. Moreover, reports indicate that the Shahed’s very low flight altitude makes tracking difficult for Ukrainian fighter radars. As for mobile anti-aircraft networks, while cost-effectiveness is highly favorable in this case, the effectiveness of these measures is inconsistent. Russian attackers have also implemented variants to complicate Ukrainian responses, such as units painted black for nighttime attacks.

While currently, Ukraine has mostly been able to ‘fight off’ Shahed drone attacks with EW systems, Russians are constantly trying to find ways to counter these efforts. This has led to Ukrainian development teams recently presenting new hard-kill weapon systems to take down the Shaheds more reliably.

The first is an electric-powered FPV interceptor drone named “Sting,” developed by the renowned Ukrainian entity Wild Hornets. The Sting can fly at speeds exceeding 160 kilometers per hour and at altitudes up to 3000 meters. It is a hybrid between an FPV drone and an electric missile, with initial control similar to standard FPV drones, with an operator controlling it via first-person-view goggles. However, variants incorporating artificial intelligence technology for automatic targeting are also nearing completion, allowing for scalable deployment and usage. The key to this development is its ultra-low cost, estimated at ten times less than the Shahed-136. Recent articles have shown detailed photographs of the system, revealing a camera and sensor module on the upper part, reflecting its flight orientation. These media and social network appearances, describing details and showing test flights, suggest its deployment is imminent.

The second development is a small, high-speed, fixed-wing interceptor drone named Hitchhiker. Developed in collaboration with the American companies IronNet and Asterion, it can reach a very high speed of 450 kilometers per hour, compared to the Shahed’s 160 kilometers per hour. Its operational range is 200 kilometers, and one of its primary features is its semi-automatic operation, integrated into a surveillance radar network with threat-tracking capacities, which guides the Hitchhiker to the vicinity of the drone, where a targeting system completes the operation. The Hitchhiker has already been successfully tested in real combat, and due to its excellent performance, low cost, and high scalability, it is considered the next “game-changer” in the drone arms race.

Overall, while the Shahed 136 initially became a critical factor in Russia’s aerial attack strategy and has been a decisive element in targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, the various weapons and countermeasures deployed by Ukrainian defenders have gradually minimized its significance as the war has progressed. Nonetheless, Ukraine, through its domestic industry and collaborations with allies, continues to develop multiple innovative initiatives to eliminate the Shahed threat completely. Western technological superiority, reliance on a multitude of complementary projects, and the limited technological development potential of Russia and their allies due to international sanctions only accelerate the positive trend for Ukraine in the crucial drone warfare domain.

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