Russian Strategy in Donetsk: Incremental Advances or Major Offensive?

In this strategic update we examine potential Russian military actions following recent advances in the Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka directions. We will also evaluate the pace of Russian progress since late 2024, highlighting that, contrary to Russian disinformation narratives, it remains significantly slower than during the war's initial months.

Recent Russian advances near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka indicate that the war in Ukraine remains active, with a fluid front line in Donetsk Oblast. Unlike large-scale operational maneuvers, these gains stem from a methodical process of identifying and exploiting tactical vulnerabilities in Ukrainian defenses. Russian forces are now advancing faster than at any point in 2023.

The Institute for the Study of War recently outlined three possible courses of action the Russian command might pursue following their advances in the Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka directions.

The first course of action involves Russian forces advancing southeast, east, and northeast of Velyka Novosilka to encircle the settlement from the flanks while avoiding its immediate southern defenses. This suggests an effort to bypass Velyka Novosilka and its chain of southern settlements, likely due to stronger Ukrainian defenses in those areas. By pressuring the southwestern and eastern flanks, Russian command aims to compel a Ukrainian withdrawal without engaging in costly frontal assaults. This approach highlights Russia's focus on probing for weaknesses in Ukrainian defenses to enable incremental advances.

Russian forces are now threatening key Ukrainian supply lines supporting defenses in Velyka Novosilka. Reports indicate they are within three kilometers of road T0518, a vital route connecting Velyka Novosilka to road H15 and supporting Ukrainian forces near Kurakhove. Additionally, they are estimated to be just four kilometers from road O0510, which links Velyka Novosilka to Hulyaipole.

Ongoing Russian pressure on these supply lines likely undermines the sustainability of Ukrainian defenses in Velyka Novosilka. The area's geography leaves no viable road connections from Velyka Novosilka to the northwest, further complicating logistics.

The Institute for the Study of War’s second course of action envisions Russian forces advancing toward Andriivka via the H15 road, west of Kurakhove, and from the south. This maneuver aims to close Ukrainian pockets near Kurakhove and align the front line.

Military analysts suggest that Russian forces are advancing toward Andriivka from Rozdolne while simultaneously attempting to encircle Ukrainian troops north of the Kurakhivske reservoir. Capturing Andriivka could enable Russia to envelop both Ukrainian pockets simultaneously.

Further Russian advances south and southwest from Sontsivka could support efforts to encircle a larger pocket of Ukrainian forces near Andriivka. Securing Andriivka would also help align the flank from Rozdolne to Highway H15, facilitating Russian attempts to level the front line between Selydove and Rozdolne, potentially setting the stage for an assault on Pokrovsk in 2025.

The Institute for the Study of War's third course of action involves Russian forces advancing west and southwest from Selydove toward Andriivka to collapse the Ukrainian pocket north of Kurakhove and cut off Ukrainian escape routes.

Since capturing Selydove in late October, Russian forces have continued advancing west and southwest. Their movements toward Novodmytrivka and Sontsivka aim to encircle Ukrainian defenders north of the Kurakhivske reservoir.

The Institute for the Study of War noted that it remains unclear which, if any, of the outlined courses of action the Russian command will pursue, as these were not part of their original objectives for the fall 2024 campaign in Donetsk. However, recent confirmed advances align with two of the proposed strategies: pushing west along the H15 toward the Andriivka-Kostyantynopil line from Kurakhove, and bypassing Velyka Novosilka to threaten Ukrainian supply lines in eastern Zaporizhzhia.

Since fall 2024, the Russian military's pace of advance has increased compared to 2023 and earlier in 2024 but remains far slower than the rapid gains seen early in the war. Unfortunately, some recent Western media reports have echoed Russian disinformation narratives, misleadingly equating current progress with the large-scale advances at the start of the invasion.

The Institute for the Study of War estimates that since November 1, 2024, Russian forces have gained 574 square kilometers, averaging 22 square kilometers per day. This is a fraction—less than 2%—of the 1,265 square kilometers per day gained in March 2022. With over 8,000 square kilometers still needed to meet the Kremlin's goal of fully capturing Donetsk Oblast, Russian forces would require at least a year at their current pace to achieve just this one goal. Notably, these gains have focused on rural areas, avoiding Ukrainian strongholds. Major cities like Slovyansk and Kramatorsk remain heavily fortified, posing far greater challenges to Russian advances.

Overall, evidence indicates that Russian forces have not regained the capacity for large-scale maneuvers or deep penetrations into Ukrainian defenses. Instead, their increased pace of advances in southeastern Ukraine reflects a gradual process of identifying and exploiting tactical vulnerabilities. The summer redeployment of Ukrainian forces to stabilize the Pokrovsk front created openings that Russia has sought to exploit. However, the Ukrainian command is now deploying reserves to stabilize the Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka fronts. Quantified data further highlight that the current Russian advance rate remains significantly slower than the rapid gains seen in the war's early weeks.

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